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Abstract 
 
Hedonic price regressions have become a standard tool to study how prices of commodity goods are 
related to quality attributes. In this paper, we extend the traditional price specification by 
incorporating three sources of unobserved heterogeneity related to sellers, buyers, and matches 
between buyers and sellers. The extended price specification is estimated on a unique exhaustive 
dataset of nearly 15 million transactions occurring in French wholesale fish markets from 2002 to 
2007. Results show that unobserved heterogeneity plays a significant role in price formation. For 
some species, its inclusion in price regressions changes the coefficients of quality-related fish 
characteristics. Last, using data analysis techniques, we classify fish and crustacean species by the 
extent to which price variations are related to fish characteristics, time effects and the three sources 
of unobserved heterogeneity. 
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1. Introduction 
Hedonic price regressions introduced by the seminal paper of Rosen (1974) have become a widely 
used approach to study how prices of commodity goods are affected by quality attributes. Each good 
is characterized by a set of attributes and the unit price of a good is fixed on the market according to 
supply and demand. The marginal price of every attribute at equilibrium is evaluated from the 
regression of the unit price on the whole set of attributes. Estimations are usually conducted on 
cross-section data using Ordinary Least Squares.  
A limit of the traditional hedonic approach is that it does not take into account the unobserved 
heterogeneity of agents. However, prices can be affected by this unobserved heterogeneity as 
producers can differ in their marginal cost and buyers can differ in their willingness to pay for 
different products. Moreover, the quality of goods may be partially unobserved as the usual variables 
measuring quality may not be sufficient to fully describe goods, and the unobserved component of 
quality may vary across producers.  
In fact, the measured effect of observable quality attributes on the price of goods can change when 
unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account, since goods with specific attributes may be sold by 
producers with specific marginal costs or bought only by consumers with specific tastes. The 
involvement of specific producer-seller pairs in transactions may also matter since there may be 
long-term relationships with discounts, and some information on the unobserved component of the 
quality of goods sold by some producers may be known only by some buyers. 
The main contribution of this paper is to study the role of the unobserved heterogeneity of 
producers, buyers, and producer-buyer matches in price formation using hedonic price regressions. 
Our application is on fish, for which we have a unique exhaustive dataset of around 15 million 
transactions at French wholesale fish auctions over the 2002-2007 period. 
Our approach borrows tools from labor economics; since the seminal paper by Abowd, Kramarz and 
Margolis (1999), a literature has developed incorporating the unobserved heterogeneity of firms and 
workers in wage regressions through the use of two series of fixed effects. This approach has been 
expanded to take into account specific effects for pairs of firms and workers (Woodcock, 2008, 2011; 
Sørensen and Vejlin, 2013). In our paper, we use a similar approach for fish prices per kilo with a 
specification incorporating fish characteristics, time fixed effects, seller fixed effects, buyer fixed 
effects and seller-buyer match effects. Identification is guaranteed by the tracking across time of 
seller and buyer accounts specific to wholesale fish markets. 
Our work complements the literature on hedonic price regressions that takes into account, at best, 
unobserved seller heterogeneity using store fixed effects when retail prices are studied (Lach, 2002). 
The most significant applications on specific food products mostly concern wine (Nerlove, 1995; 
Combris, Lecocq and Visser, 1997; Ashenfelter, 2008), cereals (Stanley and Tschirhart, 1991) and fish. 
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For applications on fish, cross-sectional hedonic price regressions have been used to study ex-vessel 
prices of fish sold at wholesale auction (McConnell and Strand, 2000; Kristofersson and Rickertsen, 
2004, 2007; Asche and Guillen, 2012) and to analyze retail prices in shops to assess the importance of 
packaging, brand or eco-labelling (Roheim, Gardiner and Asche, 2007; Roheim, Asche and Insignares, 
2011).1 Contrary to previous studies on ex-vessel prices which usually focus on one single species or 
one single fish market, we provide results for most fish species based on estimations on transactions 
occurring on all French fish markets. 
More precisely, we report regression results without and with unobserved heterogeneity for most of 
the fish and crustacean species with a significant market share. We also propose a way to classify 
species by the extent to which fish characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity among sellers, 
buyers and seller-buyer matches, contribute to explaining fish price variations. Note that we cannot 
disentangle buyer fixed effects and market effects because we cannot track buyers across markets in 
our data. However, we provide some hints on the importance of market effects by decomposing 
variations in buyer effects into variations within and between markets.  
Our results show that, for most species, while fish characteristics remain the main determinant of 
fish prices, heterogeneity among sellers, buyers and matches also contributes to explaining prices. 
The role of matches remains modest. Interestingly, the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity in the 
analysis affects the marginal effect of fish characteristics on prices for several species. This suggests 
that unobserved heterogeneity terms should be included in regressions as controls to avoid biased 
estimates of the effect of observable fish attributes. 
Data analysis techniques were used to classify fish and crustacean species into four groups. One 
group comprises species such as sole, monkfish or Norway lobster (live or frozen) for which fish 
characteristics play an important role in price setting. A second group includes species such as hake, 
cuttlefish or John Dory, with an explanatory power of buyer and time effects respectively larger and 
smaller than the average. Conversely, a third group is characterized by an explanatory power of 
buyer and time effects respectively smaller and larger than the average, and includes lobster, squid, 
red mullet, seabass (non-line caught), pollack and ling. Finally, the fourth group comprises species 
such as mackerel, with a larger-than-average explanatory power of time, seller and match effects. 
Interestingly, the four groups of species differ in the average price per kilo, seasonality and 
downstream markets. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical strategy used to 
quantify the importance of fish characteristics, time, seller, buyer and match effects in explaining 
                                                          
1 Controlled experiments have also been used to assess consumers’ willingness to pay for specific fish attributes such as 
color (Alfnes, Guttormsen, Steine and Kolstad, 2006). 
4 
 
variations in fish prices. Section 3 presents our dataset of fish transactions along with descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 comments our results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical strategy 
In this section, we explain how unobserved heterogeneity can be incorporated in hedonic price 
regressions when panel data on fish transactions are available, and sellers and buyers can be tracked 
across time. We also explain how the role of factors in explaining fish price variations can be 
quantified. 
For a given fish species, we denote by 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 the log price of a transaction 𝑖 for a fish lot which is sold 
by a seller 𝑗 and purchased by a buyer 𝑘 during month 𝑡. We suppose that the logarithm of fish price 
per kilo across time 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 depends on a set of fish characteristics 𝑋𝑖  composed of dummies related to 
size, presentation and quality. The standard hedonic specification is given by:  
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡        (1) 
where 𝛽 is a vector of parameters, 𝜗𝑡 is a month-year fixed effect, and 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 is a random error term. 
This specification is usually estimated with Ordinary Least Squares. 
It is possible to add seller unobserved effects 𝛾𝑗  and buyer unobserved effects 𝛿𝑘  to this 
specification. In our setting where fish is sold at auctions, seller effects capture all the differences in 
fish quality across vessels that are not captured by variables in our dataset. We do not have 
information on vessels such as fishing gear or techniques, but it is unlikely that all the differences in 
fish quality across vessels would be fully captured with vessel observable attributes even if the 
related information was available. An advantage of seller unobserved effects is that they capture the 
effect of all the vessel characteristics without the risk of being non-exhaustive.  
Similarly, buyer effects capture all the differences in willingness to pay that can affect prices, as 
buyers needing fish with specific characteristics are expected to make higher bids for it at auctions. 
As we will see below when describing the data, buyers cannot be tracked across fish markets.2 
Hence, unspecified buyer effects cannot be identified separately from market effects. It should thus 
be kept in mind that buyer unobserved effects also capture market effects. The specification 
becomes: 
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡             (2) 
We treat the buyer- and seller-specific components as fixed effects because they may be correlated 
with the covariates 𝑋𝑖. For instance, vessels fishing very close to coasts and landing their catches 
daily sell small quantities of high-quality fresh fish, whereas large vessels operating away from coasts 
                                                          
2 Indeed, in our data, we only have the license codes of accounts used by buyers to purchase fish. These license 
codes are market-specific and can thus be tracked only within markets. 
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sell frozen fish in large quantities after several weeks at sea. In the same way, fish traders supplying 
restaurants will seek to buy high-quality fish, while traders supplying hypermarkets will purchase a 
broader range of fish species at lower prices. 
Specification (2) is a panel data model with two series of non-nested fixed effects. This type of model 
has been studied in the labor literature since the seminal paper by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis 
(1999) who estimate a wage equation with worker and firm fixed effects. Identification of fixed 
effects is possible only within groups of well-interconnected workers and firms (see Abowd, Creecy 
and Kramarz, 2002, for more details). Interconnection within a group is ensured because firms 
employ several workers within the group and enough workers move between firms during the period 
covered by the data. Groups are mutually exclusive as no worker in a group works for a firm in 
another group. 
By analogy, in our case, identification of fixed effects is possible only within exclusive groups of well-
interconnected vessels and buyers. Interconnection within a group is ensured because vessels sell 
fish to several buyers within the group and buyers purchase from several sellers. We only study the 
main group of well-interconnected vessels and buyers which, as will be shown, includes nearly all 
transactions for most species. As there are large numbers of seller and buyer fixed effects in the 
model, estimations are performed in two steps, as explained in Appendix A. 
Next, we introduce in equation (2) the effect of a match between seller 𝑗 and buyer 𝑘, denoted 𝜃𝑗𝑘, 
as specific matches can influence fish prices. Indeed, specific vessels sell fish lots of higher quality and 
this quality is known only by a few customers through bilateral relationships. These customers agree 
to pay a higher price for the fish lots at auctions. Match effects capture the price premium that some 
buyers agree to pay to some specific sellers. The resulting model can be decomposed into two 
equations: 
 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡                    (3a) 
𝜇𝑗𝑘 = 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝜃𝑗𝑘                          (3b) 
In equation (3a), 𝜇𝑗𝑘  is a seller-buyer fixed effect capturing all the unobserved heterogeneity terms.
3 
This fixed effect is decomposed in equation (3b) into the seller fixed effect, the buyer fixed effect and 
the match effect. The identification of the model is extensively discussed in Woodcock (2008, 2011). 
The accuracy with which a term 𝜇𝑗𝑘  is estimated increases with the number of transactions between 
seller 𝑗 and buyer 𝑘. For 𝛾𝑗, 𝛿𝑘  and 𝜃𝑗𝑘 to be separately identified, match effects must be considered 
as orthogonal to seller and buyer fixed effects. As before, sellers and buyers must be inter-
                                                          
3 It would be tempting to simply introduce the match effect in equation (2) as a random effect and take it into account using 
standard panel estimation techniques. However, this approach is less general than ours since it does not allow for a 
correlation between fish characteristics and match effects. Our approach is robust to that issue. 
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connected, so we again restrict the estimations to the main group of well-interconnected sellers and 
buyers. The estimation procedure is again detailed in Appendix A. 
Our most general specification given by (3a) and (3b) is used to perform a variance decomposition of 
fish prices. The role of fish characteristics, time, sellers, buyers and matches in explaining variations 
in fish prices is measured by the ratio between the variance of their effect and the variance of prices. 
For instance, denote by ?̂? the estimated coefficients of fish characteristics and by 𝑉(∙) the operator 
giving the variance. The importance of fish characteristics is measured by the ratio 𝑉�𝑋𝑖?̂?�/𝑉�𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡�. 
As a final step, we use these variance ratios to construct groups of species which are similar with 
respect to their price determinants. We first conduct a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based on 
the five variance ratios of fish characteristics, time, seller, buyer and match effects, to assess the 
dimensions in which species can be distinguished.4 The idea of the approach is to decrease the 
number of dimensions in which species are represented from five to a lower number by projecting 
species on a space of dimension lower than five such that distances between species are only slightly 
altered by projection. The selected subspace is such that the mean squared distance between 
projections is as high as possible or, put differently, such that the inertia of the projected cloud of 
species is maximized.  
In fact, it is possible to show that the entire space can be decomposed into axes such that the first 
one maximizes the inertia of the projection among subspaces of dimension one, the second one 
maximizes the remaining inertia, and so on (see for instance Jolliffe, 2010). As a result, axes explain a 
decreasing proportion of the total inertia of the cloud of species. In our application, we will focus on 
the two first axes as they explain most of the inertia of the cloud of species and thus contain most of 
the information contained in variance ratios which serves to differentiate species.  
We then use an Ascendant Classical Hierarchy (ACH) based on these two first axes to construct 
groups of similar species. The groups are constructed by consecutive aggregation of subgroups 
containing one or more species using the Ward distance. The aggregation procedure involves 
aggregating the two subgroups at each step such that the loss of between-group inertia is minimized, 
and then repeating the operation until there are only a few subgroups left, and these are our 
selected groups. In practice, we stop the iterative procedure when four groups are left, as any further 
reduction in the number of groups leads to a significant loss of between-group inertia. 
 
3. Description of the data 
                                                          
4 As the five variance ratios do not have the same dispersion, we follow the common practice of dividing them 
by their standard deviation so that they have a comparable influence in the determination of axes when 
conducting the principal component analysis. 
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We now give some information on the French fish markets and our dataset on fish transactions. Over 
the 2002-2007 period, 230,000 tons of fish were landed and sold every year in France, for an average 
value of 658 million euros and at an average price of 2.85 euros per kilogram (France Agrimer, 2012). 
The tonnage represents about 30% of total domestically produced seafood when frozen fish and 
aquaculture products are taken into account, but it represents less than 10% of domestic demand 
which mostly depends on imports. Fish is traded in markets between vessels and buyers, mostly at 
auctions in trading rooms, using a mobile electronic clock or by internet (see Guillotreau and 
Jiménez-Toribio, 2011, for more details). 
In France, information on every transaction is collected by the national bureau of seafood products 
(France Agrimer). This information is then processed into a data system called RIC (Réseau Inter-
Criées) and added to a unique dataset that we use in our empirical analysis. This dataset is 
exhaustive for all transactions on the domestic fresh fish market in France between January 2002 and 
December 2007.  
The data contain a small number of variables providing an accurate description of the transactions. 
We know the quantity purchased and the total value paid by the buyer, from which we deduce the 
price paid per kilo. We have the usual detailed characteristics of fish involved in the transaction: 
species, size, presentation (whole, gutted, in pieces, etc.) and quality measured by freshness (given in 
descending order from extra to low). The month and year of transactions are recorded but the exact 
day is not available. We also know whether fish is traded in auction or directly sold to the buyer.  
Finally, the dataset includes two identifiers, for vessels and buyers respectively. The buyer identifier 
is a license code corresponding to an account specific to a fish market. A limit of our data is that it is 
not possible to identify whether several accounts are owned by the same agent. To ease the 
exposition, we will refer to an account as a buyer, but it should be kept in mind that several accounts 
on one or several markets may correspond to a single buyer. 
Overall, the dataset includes 18,197,738 observations over the 2002-2007 period. We restrict the 
sample in the following way. First, we exclude transactions with a missing buyer identifier (149,709 
observations deleted).5 Second, we delete observations corresponding to direct sales and restrict our 
attention to transactions at auctions (909,307 observations deleted).6 Third, we keep only the 49 
species for which there are more than 60,000 transactions over the period (2,197,513 observations 
deleted). Fourth, for each species, we exclude the few incoherent transactions with a negative total 
value or a negative quantity (30,382 observations deleted) as well as transactions with a price per 
kilo in the bottom 0.1% or the top 0.1% to avoid potential outliers (63,971 observations deleted).  
                                                          
5 There are missing identifiers only for buyers. The identifier is always given for vessels involved in transactions. 
6 We eliminated direct sales because the fish price for such transactions is fixed in a very different way. 
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Finally, in line with our empirical strategy, for each species we keep the largest group of well inter-
connected sellers and buyers, and exclude three species for which this group does not contain most 
of the observations (282,098 observations deleted).7 For the 46 remaining species, the main group 
contains nearly all the transactions. Indeed, the main group accounts for more than 99.6% of 
transactions for 42 species and the minimum is as high as 95.1%.  
Our selection procedure leaves us with a sample of 14,564,758 transactions of fish and crustaceans 
belonging to 46 species. According to Table 1, there species are, by decreasing number of 
transactions: sole, hake, monkfish, seabass (not line-caught), red mullet, squid, whiting, mackerel, 
Pollack, cuttlefish, plaice, conger eel, Norway lobster (live), ray, turbot, pouting, brill, red gurnard, 
megrim, black seabream, John Dory, cod, dogfish, seabass (line-caught), Norway lobster (frozen), 
gilthead seabream (not line-caught), horse mackerel, capelin, octopus, tub gurnard, ling, lemon sole, 
smouth-hound, haddock, thornback ray, grey mullet, cuckoo ray, meager, spider crab, crab, spotted 
ray, lobster, common seabream, common dab, sand sole and wedge sole.  
[ Insert Table 1 here ] 
According to Figure 1, which gives the contribution of each fish species to the total market value, 
trade is concentrated on a limited number of species. The two main species, sole and monkfish, 
represent 26.9% of total value. The first five species represent 44.2% of the total market and the first 
ten species 66.7%.  
[ Insert Figure 1 here ] 
Table 1 shows considerable heterogeneity in the average price per kilo and the average quantity 
involved in transactions across species. The most expensive species is lobster, with a price per kilo 
around 21 euros. There are several very cheap species, such as mackerel, with a price per kilo below 
2 euros. The correlation between the average quantity per lot and the average price is negative at -
0.50. Whereas the average quantity per lot is as low as 8.1 kilos for lobster, it reaches 122.0 kilos for 
mackerel and peaks at 200.4 kilos for cuttlefish. In fact, the size of lots sold at auction can vary 
considerably. The standard deviation for average quantity per lot is highest for mackerel at 1111.9 
kilos. 
Table 2 sheds some light on the market structure. The numbers of buyers and sellers vary 
considerably across species. Among species with a significant market share, there are around 3200 
vessels selling to 3000 buyers for sole, but only 400 vessels selling to 1000 buyers for Norway lobster 
(live). The correlation between numbers of buyers and sellers is 0.88. What matters in our empirical 
application is the degree of interconnection between the two. It can be crudely assessed from the 
                                                          
7 The three fish species excluded from the sample are sardine (114,784 transactions), white seabream (75,279 transactions) 
and anchovy (72,884 transactions). For each of these three species, the share of transactions in the main group is 53.8%, 
61.1% and 76.3%, respectively. For the remaining 46 species, only 19,151 transactions are excluded because they are not in 
the main group. 
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number of buyers per seller and the number of sellers per buyer. For all species in our sample, there 
is a very good inter-connection between sellers and buyers. For instance, for sole, each vessel sells 
fish to 43 buyers on average, and each buyer purchases fish from 40 sellers on average. The two 
numbers exceed 12 for all species. The average number of buyers per seller is 23 and the average 
number of sellers per buyer is 25. 
[ Insert Table 2 here ] 
A match is defined as a seller-buyer pair involved in at least one transaction. The number of matches 
varies a great deal across species. Among species with a significant market share, there are 129,482 
matches for sole, but only 25,437 for Norway lobster (live). The minimum for all species is 10,328 and 
the average is 44,231. The correlations between number of matches and numbers of sellers and 
buyers are, respectively, 0.82 and 0.88. The estimation accuracy of match effects depends on the 
number of transactions per match. Figure 2 gives statistics on the number of transactions per match 
for every species. The first decile is 2 or above for all species except two (grey mullet and lobster). 
The median is quite high as it takes a value of 8 or above for all species. Finally, the ninth decile is 
above 30 for all species and reaches a maximum for sole at 144. 
[ Insert Figure 2 here ] 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Hedonic prices regressions 
Coefficient estimates 
In Table 3, we report results of hedonic price regressions for the two species which have by far the 
highest market shares, sole and monkfish. Estimation results are given for three specifications: one 
without unobserved heterogeneity (equation 1), one including additive seller and buyer fixed effects 
(equation 2), and one including seller-buyer fixed effects (equation 3a).   
[ Insert Table 3 ] 
In Panel A for sole, column 1 corresponds to the Ordinary Least Squares estimates when fish 
characteristics and month dummies are introduced.8 The R² is 0.481, meaning that observable fish 
characteristics and time explain as much as 48.1% of price variations. The coefficients of fish 
characteristics have the expected sign. While small fish (sizes 4 and 5, and to a lesser extent size 3) is 
cheaper than large fish (size 1), medium-sized fish (size 2) is the most expensive. Medium-sized fish is 
                                                          
8 The quantity of fish purchased is excluded from the specification. Indeed, it is potentially endogenous since fish lot sizes 
may be influenced by the expected selling price. Still, we conducted a robustness check to assess whether adding the 
logarithm of fish quantity to our specification affects the results. Whereas this variable is found to have a significant 
negative effect, its inclusion has absolutely no effect on the magnitude of the coefficients of fish characteristics and does 
not improve the fit of the model. For sole, for instance, the R² increases only at the margin from 0.4814 to 0.4818 when 
adding fish quantity to the set of explanatory variables. 
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6.1% more expensive than large fish, but the smallest fish is 40% less expensive.9 Results are 
consistent with medium-sized fish being the most valued. Presentation significantly influences price 
per kilo. Low-quality fish (grade B) is 45.6% cheaper than extra-quality fish (grade E). Gutted fish is 
7.9% more expensive than whole fish because non-edible parts have been eliminated.  
Month-year effects are represented in Figure B1 in Appendix B. There is an upward trend over time 
consistent with inflation. Prices also exhibit seasonality effects, fish being more expensive during 
summer holidays (July and August) and in December when demand is higher during the Christmas 
and New Year period. 
We then estimate a specification where seller and buyer fixed effects have been added. Results 
reported in column (2) show a significant improvement of the fit with an increase of the R² from 
0.481 to 0.614. This suggests some heterogeneity among vessels and buyers. Some coefficients of 
fish characteristics change when seller and buyer fixed effects are included in the model, but the 
results remain qualitatively similar. In particular, the price of gutted fish is now only 1.2% higher than 
that of whole fish. 
Finally, we consider a hedonic price specification with seller-buyer fixed effects. Results reported in 
column 3 show that the fit improves, with the R² increasing from 0.614 to 0.659. This increase may 
seem rather modest, but the contribution of match effects to explaining variations in fish prices is 
significant, accounting for 25.3% of the overall contribution of unobserved heterogeneity terms.10 
The introduction of seller-buyer fixed effects instead of seller and buyer fixed effects does not have 
much effect on the coefficients of fish characteristics.11 
Results obtained for monkfish are reported in Panel B and lead to quite similar overall conclusions. 
Ordinary Least Squares estimates show that prices are higher for fish which is larger, of better 
quality, or sold in pieces. As shown in Figure B2 in Appendix B, there is an upward time trend and a 
seasonal effect, with fish being more expensive in December. Introducing seller and buyer fixed 
effects in a standard hedonic price regression increases the R² from 0.582 to 0.693. Introducing 
seller-buyer fixed effects instead of seller and buyer fixed effects increases the R² to 0.734. Hence, all 
sources of unobserved heterogeneity contribute to explaining price variations. Estimated coefficients 
of fish characteristics are influenced by the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, 
whereas gutted fish is 4.7% cheaper than whole fish when the specification does not contain any 
heterogeneity term, it is found to be 16% more expensive when seller and buyer fixed effects are 
added. 
                                                          
9 These percentages are given by (exp(0.059)-1)*100 and (exp(-0.515)-1)*100, respectively. Other percentages in the text 
are computed in the same way. 
10 This percentage is computed as (0.659-0.614)/(0.659-0.481)*100. 
11 The profile of time effects when all sources of unobserved heterogeneity are introduced is given in an appendix external 
to the paper available upon request. It is nearly confounded with the one obtained when no source of unobserved 
heterogeneity is introduced.  
11 
 
We estimate hedonic price regressions for every species to obtain systematic conclusions about the 
importance of unobserved heterogeneity in explaining variations in fish prices.12 Interestingly, the 
introduction of unobserved heterogeneity changes the effect of some fish characteristics in a sizable 
way for several species. For cuttlefish in particular, whereas low quality fish (grade B) is 30.0% less 
expensive than extra quality fish (grade E) when unobserved heterogeneity terms are omitted, it is 
only 10.8% less expensive when seller and buyer fixed effects are introduced. There is a similar 
pattern for hake, the respective figures being 50.5% and 38.6%. For cod, whereas fillets are 63.7% 
more expensive than whole fish when unobserved heterogeneity terms are omitted, they are only 
18.3% more expensive when seller and buyer fixed effects are introduced.  
For Norway lobster (frozen), it is the opposite, with pieces being 53.2% less expensive than whole 
lobster when unobserved heterogeneity is omitted, but only 37.6% less expensive when seller and 
buyer fixed effects are introduced into the regression. Differences can be explained by some 
unobserved heterogeneity among sellers correlated both with the presentation category and 
unobserved fish quality, as vessels use different types of fishing gear. They can also be explained by 
some unobserved heterogeneity among buyers in the willingness to pay, correlated with 
presentation category, as there are different types of buyers such wholesalers, multiple grocers or 
mongers, and different downstream markets where buyers resell fish. 
 
Price variations explained by fish characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity terms 
We also evaluate the explanatory power of unobserved heterogeneity terms for each species. Figure 
3 reports, for each species, the R² obtained when unobserved heterogeneity is not taken into 
account, the R² increase when seller and buyer fixed effects are added to the specification, and the 
R² increase when seller-buyer fixed effects are considered instead of seller and buyer fixed effects. 
The R² obtained when unobserved heterogeneity is not taken into account is quite high, with an 
average of 0.47, but it varies across species. Among species with a significant market share, it is only 
0.27 for the mackerel, but it reaches 0.70 for Norway lobster (frozen). 
[ Insert Figure 3 ] 
The explanatory power of seller and buyer fixed effects is relatively high as well, since the R² 
increases on average by 0.20 when they are introduced in the regression. The R² increase varies 
across species, from as little as 0.06 for seabass (line-caught), up to 0.37 for cuttlefish. Finally, the 
explanatory power of match effects is significant, but not large. When introducing seller-buyer fixed 
effects instead of seller and buyer fixed effects in the regression, the R² increases on average by 0.06. 
The R² increase is only 0.02 for Norway lobster (live or frozen), but reaches 0.11 for ling. 
                                                          
12 Results for other species are reported in the external appendix. 
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4.2. Variance analysis of fish prices for all species 
Explanatory power of fish, seller, buyer and match effects 
Another way to assess the importance of the different factors in explaining fish price variations is to 
conduct a variance analysis of the most general specification including fish characteristics, time fixed 
effects, seller fixed effects, buyer fixed effects and match effects.13 Table 4 reports, for every factor, 
the ratio between the variance of its effect and the variance of fish prices.14 The higher the variance 
ratio of an effect, the higher the explanatory power of the related factor. 
As expected, the explanatory power of fish characteristics is high, as the average variance ratio for 
fish characteristics is 31.9%. There are large variations across species: this ratio is only 7.9% for squid, 
but 61.1% for Norway lobster (frozen). Time fixed effects have a lower explanatory power, but it is 
still significant, as the average variance ratio for time fixed effects is 10.4%. This ratio is very large for 
some specific species with seasonal demand. For instance, the ratio is 33.2% for lobster, which is 
consumed in large quantities in summer and in December, but less during the rest of the year.  
Overall, unobserved heterogeneity has a high explanatory power for many species, the average 
variance ratio for the sum of all the unobserved heterogeneity terms being 29.2%. Buyer 
heterogeneity is the main unobserved factor affecting prices. In particular, the variance ratio of buyer 
effects is larger than that of seller effects for all species, and it is larger than that of match effects for 
all species except one. The average variance ratio of buyer effects is 20.7%. The ratio is low for 
cuckoo ray and seabass (line-caught), at 4.2% and 5.2%, respectively, but very high for cuttlefish, at 
43.6%. By contrast, the average variance ratio of seller effects is only 5.2%. It is very low for some 
species such as Norway lobster (live) for which it is only 1.5%, but it is quite high for other species 
such as crab and octopus, at 14.6% and 15.2%, respectively. Finally, the average variance ratio of 
match effects is 6.2%, with some variations across species. It is quite low for Norway lobster (frozen) 
at 2.1%, but reaches 10.6% for ling. 
 
Decomposition of variances within and between fish markets 
We now assess to what extent fish prices are related to local markets by further decomposing 
variations of fish, seller and buyer effects into variations within and between fish markets.15 For fish 
and seller effects, variations between fish markets correspond to spatial differences, respectively, in 
                                                          
13 Match effects are obtained by further estimating equation (3b), as explained in Appendix A. 
14 Note that ratios do not sum to 1. This is because covariances between the different types of effects are not equal to zero. 
For the sake of brevity, we did not report covariances, but they are available upon request. 
15 We do not present any decomposition for match effects as their average in each market is zero by construction. This 
occurs because one of our identification conditions given in Section 3 is equivalent to match effects being orthogonal to 
buyer dummies. This yields that the average of estimated match effects for each buyer is zero. As the average of match 
effects in a market is a weighted average of mean match effects computed for each buyer on that market, the average of 
match effects in that market is zero. 
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observed quality measured by size, presentation and quality grade, and in unobserved quality related 
to fishing practices. For buyer effects, variations capture both spatial differences in the local 
composition of buyers with respect to their willingness to pay, and differences between local market 
effects. Note that we cannot disentangle these two sources of variations as accounts are market-
specific and the identity of buyers with accounts on several markets is not available.  
Table 5 reports the shares of within- and between-market variance for fish, seller and buyer effects 
for every species. For the effect of fish characteristics, most variations occur within markets, as only 
20.8% of variations can be attributed, on average, to differences between markets. Spatial 
differences are larger for some species, such as monkfish, for which the share of between-market 
variance reaches 61.1%. They are very small for some others, such as seabass (line-caught), for which 
the share of between-market variance is only 3.3%.  
For seller effects, more than half of variations occur between markets, as the average share of 
between-market variance is 59.4%. This suggests significant variations in fish practices across space. 
There are large differences between species as the share of between-market variance reaches 95.2% 
for cuckoo ray, but only 19.6% for plaice. Finally, for buyer effects, most of variations occur between 
fish markets as the share of between-market variance reaches 73.4%. This can be explained by the 
sorting of buyers across space according to their willingness to pay, the strong influence of local 
markets, or both. There are differences between species, with the share of between-market variance 
ranging from 94.5% for cuttlefish to just 48.1% for pollack.  
[ Insert Table 5 here ] 
 
Robustness checks 
In our approach, a match effect is estimated as the average of price residuals at the match level once 
fish, seller and buyer effects have been netted out (see Appendix A for more details). When there is 
only one transaction for a match, the estimated match effect is the single price residual. It becomes 
clear that there is an identification issue as the estimated match effect captures both the true match 
effect and the noise specific to the price of the transaction. As a robustness check, we replicated our 
analysis considering only transactions for matches with at least 2, 5 or 10 transactions, as this should 
alleviate identification problems at the expense of making a non-random selection on transactions.16 
We now contrast our baseline results on the explanatory power of the different factors measured by 
their variance ratio with those obtained when restricting the sample to transactions in matches 
involving at least 5 transactions. We find that the explanatory power of matches is smaller as the 
average variance ratio of match effects decreases from 6.2% to 2.4%. This decrease can be explained 
                                                          
16 Detailed results are reported in our external appendix which is available upon request. 
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by an attenuation of noise in our measure of match effects or a selection effect such that 
transactions for specific matches with a small number of transactions with extreme prices have been 
discarded from the sample. In fact, the variance ratio of match effects is small for all species as it is 
always below 2.5%.17 Considering only transactions for matches with at least 10 transactions in the 
estimations gives similar qualitative results, although variance ratios of match effects are now even 
smaller as their average is 1.5%. 
 
4.3. A classification of fish and crustacean species 
As a last step in our analysis, we attempt to construct groups of fish and crustacean species which are 
similar with respect to their price determinants. We first conduct a principal component analysis to 
identify the dimensions in which fish and crustaceans differ. We use five variables, which are the 
variance ratios of fish characteristics, time effects, seller effects, buyer effects and match effects, and 
whose values are reported in Table 4.18  
Results are summarized in Table 6 and the two main axes of the principal component analysis are 
represented in Figure 4.19 The first axis is by far the main dimension in which species differ, as it 
explains a full 46% of the inertia of the cloud of species. It opposes fish characteristics to the 
unobservables related to sellers, buyers and matches. This opposition is driven by the large negative 
correlations between the effects of fish characteristics and match effects (-0.68), seller effects (-0.43) 
and buyer effects (-0.43). The second axis has less importance, explaining less than 23% of the inertia 
of the cloud of species. It mostly opposes time effects and buyer effects, the correlation between 
these two types of effects being rather low, at -0.17. 
[ Insert Table 6 here ] 
[ Insert Figure 4 here ] 
We then use the positions of species on the first two axes in an ascendant classical hierarchy to 
construct groups of species with similar price determinants. We consider a classification with four 
groups which are represented in Figure 5.20 Most species in the first group have negative values on 
the first axis and fish characteristics usually have a large explanatory power. The variance ratio of fish 
                                                          
17 Another noticeable difference with our baseline results is that the variance ratios of vessel and buyer effects are now 
simultaneously significantly larger for mackerel, red gurnard, horse mackerel and mullet, whereas the variance ratio of the 
sum of all the unobserved heterogeneity terms is smaller. These contrasting results cannot be explained by the decrease in 
the variance ratio of match effects as it is too small to compensate for the increase in the variance ratios of vessel and 
buyer effects. However, they can be explained by an increase in the negative correlation between vessel fixed effects and 
buyer fixed effects in absolute terms. Even if the variance ratios of vessel and buyer effects are larger, the variance ratio of 
their sum does not need to be larger as the negative correlation between vessel and buyer fixed effects has increased.   
18 Horse mackerel is excluded from the analysis because it looks like an outlier (its variance ratio of buyer effects is very high 
at 83.7%). Furthermore, its market share is very low. 
19 Appendix C reports the coordinates of species on the two first axes, as well as their contributions and some projection 
information. 
20 This is the number of classes below ten where the Calinski/Harabasz Pseudo-R² has a local maximum. 
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characteristics is 44.6% on average in this group, compared to 32.4% for the whole sample of species. 
Unobserved heterogeneity does not play much of a role for most species in this group. The average 
variance ratios of seller, buyer and match effects are all below the averages computed for the whole 
sample of species. In particular, the group contains sole, monkfish, Norway lobster (live or frozen), 
seabass (line-caught), turbot and haddock. Most species are expensive (around 10€/kg) and highly 
differentiated across presentation categories, consistent with an important role of fish characteristics 
in price formation. For instance, Norway lobsters are less valued when frozen rather than alive, 
except the largest ones, monkfish is more valued whole rather than beheaded, and portion-size soles 
(ie. size 2) are the most appreciated.  
Most species in the second group have negative values on the second axis. Time effects usually have 
a low explanatory power and buyer effects have an explanatory power slightly above average. The 
average variance ratios of time and buyer effects are respectively 5.6% and 22.2%, compared to 
10.5% and 19.3% for the whole sample of species. This group includes hake, cuttlefish, John Dory, 
cod, ray, plaice and conger eels. These species have a low price (around 4€ per kilo) which is not 
subject to seasonal variability as fish is caught the whole year and is purchased mostly by 
wholesalers. Willingness to pay differs among buyers depending on their downstream markets. 
Indeed, marketing efforts (such as discounted prices and advertising) are sometimes considerable as 
these species are of low value and the profits buyers can derive from sales vary across downstream 
customers.  
Nearly all species in the third group have positive values on both the first and second axis, and are 
characterized by a large explanatory power of time effects and a slightly below average explanatory 
power of seller and match effects. In particular, time effects have an average variance ratio of 18.3% 
compared to 10.5% for the whole sample of species. This group includes lobster, squid, red mullet, 
seabass (non-line caught), pollack and ling. With the noticeable exception of lobster which is caught 
in traps, all these species sell at around 7€ per kilo and are caught seasonally by pelagic trawlers. For 
lobster, consumers' willingness to pay varies seasonally and is highest during summer and the 
Christmas holidays. 
Finally, the fourth group is characterized by a high explanatory power of buyer, seller and match 
effects. The variance ratios of these three types of effects are respectively 30.0%, 9.1% and 8.3%, 
compared to 19.3%, 5.0% and 6.2% for the whole sample of species. The only species in that group 
with a significant market share is mackerel. This low-value species is mainly harvested in the English 
Channel by trawlers and sold to wholesalers who export it frozen or canned to foreign markets 
where it is sold at rather cheap prices. It is also caught by small-scale vessels (such as purse-seiners, 
gill-netters or liners) and sold to wholesalers who resell it on retail markets for higher prices. This 
may explain the high variance ratios of the three unobserved heterogeneity terms, as large trawlers 
16 
 
and small-scale vessels differ in their production costs, sellers differ in their willingness to pay 
depending on how products are presented on the downstream markets, and there can be specific 
matches depending on the segment of the downstream market involved.   
To sum up, the sample of species can be divided into group 1 for which the variance ratio of fish 
characteristics is significantly above average, and groups 2, 3 and 4 for which different combinations 
of variance ratios of time, seller and buyer effects deviate significantly from the average. 
Interestingly, groups of species differ in their average price per kilo, seasonality and downstream 
markets. 
 [ Insert Table 7 here ] 
[ Insert Figure 5 here ] 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have shown how the unobserved heterogeneity of sellers, buyers, as well as 
matches between sellers and buyers, can be simultaneously taken into account in hedonic price 
regressions. Estimations are conducted separately for most fish and crustacean species with a 
significant market share using a unique exhaustive dataset containing some information on all 
transactions occurring in French fish markets over the 2002-2007 period. Our work contrasts with the 
literature, as the typical study usually focuses on one single species or one single fish market, and 
regresses fish prices on a set of observable characteristics related to fish quality. 
When unobserved heterogeneity terms are included in hedonic price regressions, the effects of 
quality-related fish characteristics change significantly for some species. For almost all species, 
observable fish characteristics are found to have the largest explanatory power, but the explanatory 
power of seller, buyer and match effects is also significant. We finally propose a classification of fish 
and crustacean species depending on the explanatory power of observables and unobservables using 
a principal component analysis followed by an ascendant classical hierarchy. This classification tends 
to differentiate species by their value, seasonality and downstream markets. 
A limit of our approach is that we cannot distinguish market effects from buyer effects because 
buyers cannot be tracked across markets. A decomposition of the variance of buyer effects within 
and between markets shows that market effects could be large. Future research could try to assess 
the importance of market effects using a dataset tracking buyers across markets. Once market 
effects net of all sources of heterogeneity are recovered, additional exercises can be conducted, such 
as testing the law of one price across markets or assessing the extent to which market structure can 
affect local prices. 
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Figure 1. Contributions of fish and crustacean species to total market value 
 
Source: RIC 2002-2007, authors’ calculations. 
Note: NLC = not line-caught, LC = line-caught. 
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Figure 2. Number of transactions per match 
 
Source: RIC 2002-2007, authors’ calculations. 
Note: NLC = not line-caught, LC = line-caught. 
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Figure 3. Differences in model goodness of fit 
 
 Source: RIC 2002-2007, authors’ calculations. 
Note: NLC = not line-caught, LC = line-caught. “OLS R²” gives the R-square of a specification without any unobserved 
heterogeneity terms related to sellers and buyers, which is estimated with OLS. “seller and buyer fixed effects R²” gives the 
R-square of a specification additionally  including seller and buyer fixed effects. “seller-buyer fixed effects R²” gives the R-
square of a specification including seller-buyer fixed effects, but not seller and buyer fixed effects. 
 
 
  
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
R
²
S
ol
e
H
ak
e
M
on
kf
is
h
S
ea
ba
ss
 (N
LC
)
R
ed
 m
ul
le
t
S
qu
id
W
hi
tin
g
M
ac
ke
re
l
P
ol
la
ck
C
ut
tle
fis
h
P
la
ic
e
C
on
ge
r e
el
N
or
w
ay
 lo
bs
te
r (
liv
e)
R
ay
Tu
rb
ot
P
ou
tin
g
B
ril
l
R
ed
 g
ur
na
rd
M
eg
rim
B
la
ck
 s
ea
br
ea
m
Jo
hn
 D
or
y
C
od
D
og
fis
h
S
ea
ba
ss
 (L
C
)
N
or
w
ay
 lo
bs
te
r (
fro
ze
n)
G
ilt
he
ad
 s
ea
br
ea
m
 (N
LC
)
H
or
se
 m
ac
ke
re
l
C
ap
el
in
O
ct
op
us
Tu
b 
gu
rn
ar
d
Li
ng
Le
m
on
 s
ol
e
S
m
ou
th
-h
ou
nd
H
ad
do
ck
Th
or
nb
ac
k 
ra
y
G
re
y 
m
ul
le
t
C
uc
ko
o 
ra
y
M
ea
gr
e
S
pi
de
r c
ra
b
C
ra
b
S
po
tte
d 
ra
y
Lo
bs
te
r
C
om
m
on
 s
ea
br
ea
m
C
om
m
on
 d
ab
S
an
d 
so
le
W
ed
ge
 s
ol
e
OLS R² seller and buyer fixed effects R² - OLS R² seller-buyer fixed effects R² - seller and buyer fixed effects R²
22 
 
Figure 4. Principal component analysis of variance decomposition of fish prices 
 
Source: RIC 2002-2007, authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 5. Classification of fish and crustacean species obtained from the Ascendant Classical Hierarchy 
 
Source: RIC 2002-2007, authors’ calculations. 
Note: group 1 is represented by black dots, group 2 by blue diamonds, group 3 by red squares and group 4 by green 
triangles. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics on transactions by species 
Fish species Price per kilo (in euros) Quantity per lot (in kilos) Number of 
transactions Average St. dev. Average St. dev. 
Sole 12.65 4.61 26.63 85.11 1,457,282 
Hake 5.19 2.37 30.98 258.46 1,206,817 
Monkfish 5.79 2.44 84.27 172.34 863,500 
Seabass (NLC) 10.55 4.92 29.47 102.06 705,547 
Red mullet 7.08 3.89 30.78 134.68 690,916 
Squid 7.37 3.75 58.64 166.19 549,083 
Whiting 2.38 1.48 128.52 373.34 526,094 
Mackerel 1.52 1.12 121.97 1111.85 466,378 
Pollack 4.36 2.08 39.20 116.20 466,037 
Cuttlefish 2.99 2.41 200.37 674.40 423,015 
Plaice 1.47 0.78 63.64 334.73 352,040 
Conger eel 2.20 1.39 41.52 158.21 349,239 
Norway lobster (live) 11.03 4.74 43.43 69.73 348,816 
Ray 2.89 1.42 40.91 96.22 347,955 
Turbot 14.67 5.78 8.17 16.94 338,921 
Pouting 0.86 0.67 77.62 199.78 335,741 
Brill 9.86 3.91 7.72 12.33 319,475 
Red gurnard 1.76 1.88 75.30 197.70 310,892 
Megrim 4.60 2.49 41.63 77.95 290,904 
Black seabream 3.36 2.30 62.12 513.65 280,202 
John Dory 9.34 3.91 29.25 50.26 278,069 
Cod 4.13 1.66 104.96 229.83 260,137 
Dogfish 0.62 0.45 100.65 227.21 248,799 
Seabass (LC) 14.55 3.98 23.34 40.95 239,293 
Norway lobster (frozen) 9.43 4.79 86.68 161.70 215,206 
Gilthead seabream (NLC) 9.78 5.84 16.84 46.89 185,221 
Horse mackerel 0.95 0.73 78.57 532.88 181,585 
Capelin 1.56 0.87 21.15 46.03 180,664 
Octopus 3.15 2.01 47.51 113.23 177,485 
Tub gurnard 2.85 3.24 31.78 80.38 176,692 
Ling 2.69 0.91 94.06 274.43 175,774 
Lemon sole 4.44 2.22 37.40 67.09 161,666 
Smouth-hound 1.39 0.80 66.30 139.71 158,639 
Haddock 1.80 0.86 163.21 249.45 154,963 
Thornback ray 3.17 1.52 39.21 108.76 138,070 
Grey mullet 1.51 1.12 39.46 192.27 133,904 
Cuckoo ray 1.80 0.85 138.60 167.19 111,493 
Meagre 4.71 3.16 35.86 93.24 109,290 
Spider crab 2.00 1.15 50.92 132.67 102,430 
Crab 2.59 1.31 48.36 140.08 101,098 
Spotted ray 3.03 1.20 65.16 138.58 92,074 
Lobster 20.89 6.75 8.14 15.05 86,372 
Common seabream 7.38 5.96 9.01 22.00 73,041 
Common dab 1.18 0.87 65.81 153.86 67,961 
Sand sole 6.06 2.65 16.21 31.06 65,692 
Wedge sole 5.58 2.22 62.64 200.40 60,286 
Source: RIC 2002-2007, authors’ calculations. 
Note: NLC = not line-caught, LC = line-caught. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the market 
Fish species Number of 
vessels 
Average 
number of 
vessels per 
account 
Number of 
accounts 
Average 
number of 
accounts 
per seller 
Number of 
matches 
Sole 3216 40.26 3023 42.83 129,482 
Hake 2254 44.08 2745 36.19 99,348 
Monkfish 2339 34.72 2786 29.15 81,208 
Seabass (NLC) 3543 29.63 2986 35.15 104,971 
Red mullet 2768 34.11 2884 32.73 94,403 
Squid 2195 29.88 2787 23.53 65,587 
Whiting 2444 30.55 2237 33.38 74,671 
Mackerel 2553 27.96 2895 24.66 71,383 
Pollack 2695 28.61 2153 35.81 77,092 
Cuttlefish 3108 22.33 2672 25.97 69,389 
Plaice 3334 17.16 2433 23.51 57,205 
Conger eel 2432 23.72 2042 28.25 57,681 
Norway lobster (live) 390 65.22 959 26.52 25,437 
Ray 2576 19.96 1996 25.76 51,423 
Turbot 2898 20.62 2476 24.13 59,753 
Pouting 2477 23.26 2013 28.62 57,621 
Brill 2742 22.74 2553 24.42 62,352 
Red gurnard 2340 21.84 2606 19.61 51,107 
Megrim 1007 30.48 1948 15.76 30,694 
Black seabream 2462 21.77 2135 25.11 53,610 
John Dory 2178 22.69 2418 20.44 49,413 
Cod 1780 21.00 1642 22.76 37,376 
Dogfish 2753 17.80 2119 23.13 49,012 
Seabass (LC) 1186 22.23 1464 18.01 26,361 
Norway lobster (frozen) 489 40.03 962 20.35 19,577 
Gilthead seabream (NLC) 1902 19.29 1916 19.15 36,699 
Horse mackerel 1845 15.33 1999 14.15 28,278 
Capelin 210 61.25 705 18.24 12,862 
Octopus 1726 15.36 1638 16.19 26,513 
Tub gurnard 1894 17.29 1854 17.66 32,747 
Ling 1723 19.45 1668 20.09 33,517 
Lemon sole 1361 20.21 1599 17.20 27,510 
Smouth-hound 2114 12.10 1149 22.27 25,587 
Haddock 810 24.01 1163 16.72 19,449 
Thornback ray 1692 17.47 1153 25.64 29,563 
Grey mullet 2419 14.78 2134 16.75 35,749 
Cuckoo ray 847 18.87 762 20.97 15,981 
Meagre 1039 22.37 667 34.84 23,238 
Spider crab 1304 18.17 1294 18.31 23,699 
Crab 1116 17.08 1418 13.44 19,061 
Spotted ray 1069 17.81 827 23.02 19,037 
Lobster 1453 14.04 1684 12.11 20,394 
Common seabream 343 37.09 659 19.30 12,721 
Common dab 768 13.45 511 20.21 10,328 
Sand sole 1213 12.48 858 17.64 15,138 
Wedge sole 446 23.30 461 22.54 10,392 
Source: RIC 2002-2007, authors’ calculations. 
Note: NLC = not line-caught, LC = line-caught. 
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Table 3. Results of hedonic price regressions for sole and monkfish 
A. Sole 
Explanatory variables OLS Seller and buyer 
fixed effects 
Seller-buyer 
fixed effects 
Size   2 0.059*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
(ref: 1 Large) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  3 -0.075*** -0.067*** -0.065*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  4 -0.193*** -0.197*** -0.195*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  5 (small) -0.515*** -0.537*** -0.536*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Presentation Gutted 0.076*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 
(ref: Whole) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Quality  A -0.135*** -0.062*** -0.058*** 
(ref: Extra) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  B (low) -0.680*** -0.579*** -0.582*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES 
Seller fixed effects NO YES NO 
Buyer fixed effects NO YES NO 
Seller-buyer fixed effects NO NO YES 
Number of observations 1,457,282 1,457,282 1,457,282 
R² 0.481 0.614 0.659 
 
B. Monkfish 
Explanatory variables OLS Seller and buyer 
fixed effects 
Seller-buyer 
fixed effects 
Size   2 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
(ref: 1 Large) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  3 -0.045*** -0.072*** -0.073*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  4 -0.112*** -0.134*** -0.133*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  5 (small) -0.365*** -0.365*** -0.360*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Presentation Gutted -0.048*** 0.150*** 0.155*** 
(ref: Whole) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
  Gutted head-off 0.546*** 0.711*** 0.691*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
  Gutted head-off, peeled 0.726*** 1.003*** 0.985*** 
 (0.003) (0.016) (0.020) 
  Pieces 0.743*** 0.834*** 0.824*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Quality  A -0.090*** -0.018*** -0.020*** 
(ref: Extra) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
  B (low) -0.608*** -0.517*** -0.508*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES 
Seller fixed effects NO YES NO 
Buyer fixed effects NO YES NO 
Seller-buyer fixed effects NO NO YES 
Number of observations 863,500 863,500 863,500 
R² 0.582 0.693 0.734 
Source: RIC 2002-2007, authors’ calculations. 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses; ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%.  
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Table 4. Variance decomposition of fish prices, by species 
Fish species Variance 
of price 
Fish 
characte-
ristics 
Time Unobserved heterogeneity Residual 
 All Sellers Buyers Match 
Sole 0.163 36.1% 10.5% 19.3% 2.2% 11.6% 4.5% 34.1% 
Hake 0.220 41.0% 5.9% 28.5% 6.9% 21.0% 4.6% 36.2% 
Monkfish 0.154 40.0% 9.9% 18.3% 2.4% 10.4% 4.1% 26.6% 
Seabass (NLC) 0.202 22.4% 15.6% 26.6% 5.1% 24.7% 5.1% 25.4% 
Red mullet 0.490 25.0% 18.2% 20.8% 6.0% 11.0% 5.7% 31.9% 
Squid 0.213 7.9% 24.0% 35.5% 5.0% 20.3% 4.8% 28.6% 
Whiting 0.506 32.2% 4.9% 27.4% 5.8% 15.2% 6.5% 27.3% 
Mackerel 0.654 14.7% 7.8% 33.0% 7.4% 22.9% 9.3% 42.6% 
Pollack 0.252 18.1% 14.7% 30.5% 8.0% 12.7% 8.4% 32.9% 
Cuttlefish 0.467 35.7% 6.4% 50.7% 2.0% 43.6% 3.9% 16.9% 
Plaice 0.426 42.4% 2.2% 26.6% 3.3% 17.8% 6.5% 30.4% 
Conger eel 0.429 29.9% 5.5% 28.5% 3.4% 19.2% 7.0% 26.7% 
Norway lobster (live) 0.178 48.0% 20.8% 12.9% 1.5% 11.0% 2.2% 23.8% 
Ray 0.359 48.7% 3.0% 26.1% 2.9% 18.8% 5.0% 23.1% 
Turbot 0.175 40.9% 7.7% 23.2% 2.1% 14.1% 5.3% 20.6% 
Pouting 0.573 26.8% 3.7% 36.4% 3.9% 23.0% 7.9% 29.5% 
Brill 0.194 24.2% 3.4% 38.6% 3.7% 29.7% 7.0% 24.7% 
Red gurnard 0.830 45.3% 1.4% 27.9% 11.5% 34.4% 5.1% 20.5% 
Megrim 0.405 32.0% 6.3% 30.5% 2.2% 22.8% 4.7% 31.0% 
Black seabream 0.711 43.9% 5.7% 19.2% 3.5% 10.3% 5.9% 19.4% 
John Dory 0.261 37.0% 8.1% 22.5% 2.7% 13.3% 7.6% 25.5% 
Cod 0.184 32.3% 10.5% 25.6% 4.1% 13.8% 5.9% 30.1% 
Dogfish 0.354 23.8% 15.7% 31.9% 3.2% 20.7% 10.2% 35.0% 
Seabass (LC) 0.089 41.7% 21.0% 10.9% 1.9% 5.2% 3.8% 26.2% 
Norway lobster (frozen) 0.275 61.1% 7.8% 15.0% 2.8% 10.6% 2.1% 18.5% 
Gilthead seabream (NLC) 0.602 41.0% 17.1% 15.9% 10.5% 16.8% 5.0% 20.5% 
Horse mackerel 0.574 10.5% 4.5% 53.0% 17.2% 83.7% 6.4% 32.1% 
Capelin 0.388 36.0% 21.8% 30.5% 0.7% 27.3% 3.1% 32.7% 
Octopus 0.470 26.9% 15.8% 41.8% 15.2% 24.5% 7.1% 32.8% 
Tub gurnard 1.167 11.4% 2.0% 66.6% 5.3% 46.6% 5.9% 22.8% 
Ling 0.134 11.3% 16.4% 32.6% 4.7% 16.3% 10.6% 34.9% 
Lemon sole 0.363 34.5% 7.1% 21.7% 2.4% 13.4% 5.4% 25.1% 
Smouth-hound 0.460 35.3% 12.1% 31.4% 3.5% 18.8% 6.8% 31.2% 
Haddock 0.305 46.6% 11.1% 12.7% 2.3% 8.5% 4.4% 24.2% 
Thornback ray 0.361 36.4% 3.9% 34.6% 4.0% 21.2% 7.8% 28.4% 
Grey mullet 0.561 14.4% 5.2% 43.7% 7.5% 33.4% 10.3% 27.8% 
Cuckoo ray 0.321 60.1% 5.1% 9.7% 1.7% 4.2% 4.5% 24.2% 
Meagre 0.674 21.0% 14.2% 23.4% 6.8% 9.6% 8.9% 29.6% 
Spider crab 0.405 21.1% 12.2% 45.7% 7.9% 27.5% 9.4% 28.8% 
Crab 0.338 26.8% 11.7% 29.4% 14.6% 23.7% 7.1% 29.4% 
Spotted ray 0.280 46.2% 4.5% 16.2% 2.6% 6.2% 5.8% 20.3% 
Lobster 0.105 15.7% 33.2% 28.1% 8.5% 23.2% 7.5% 22.2% 
Common seabream 0.921 48.4% 9.2% 32.5% 2.6% 28.0% 5.2% 23.7% 
Common dab 0.512 40.4% 3.6% 21.5% 3.0% 14.5% 5.0% 24.7% 
Sand sole 0.286 11.1% 9.3% 54.6% 11.7% 25.7% 7.8% 24.6% 
Wedge sole 0.190 20.7% 16.2% 31.5% 5.0% 21.3% 7.3% 32.3% 
Source: RIC 2002-2007, authors’ calculations. 
Note: NLC = not line-caught, LC = line-caught. 
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Table 5. Variance decomposition of the effect of fish characteristics, buyer and seller fixed effects, by species 
Fish species Number of  
local 
markets 
Fish characteristics 
and time 
Seller fixed effects Buyer fixed effects 
V(between) V(within) V(between) V(within) V(between) V(within) 
Sole 43 12.5% 87.5% 37.7% 62.3% 66.8% 33.2% 
Hake 39 22.7% 77.3% 52.9% 47.1% 59.3% 40.7% 
Monkfish 40 61.1% 38.9% 72.4% 27.6% 79.5% 20.5% 
Seabass (NLC) 42 6.1% 93.9% 41.1% 58.9% 72.2% 27.8% 
Red mullet 42 17.5% 82.5% 43.5% 56.5% 65.5% 34.5% 
Squid 42 14.0% 86.0% 58.1% 41.9% 73.2% 26.8% 
Whiting 35 16.5% 83.5% 33.1% 66.9% 60.4% 39.6% 
Mackerel 43 17.6% 82.4% 72.3% 27.7% 62.4% 37.6% 
Pollack 33 13.1% 86.9% 22.5% 77.5% 48.1% 51.9% 
Cuttlefish 43 17.4% 82.6% 38.7% 61.3% 94.5% 5.5% 
Plaice 39 19.6% 80.4% 19.6% 80.4% 71.0% 29.0% 
Conger eel 35 27.8% 72.2% 42.2% 57.8% 66.2% 33.8% 
Norway lobster (live) 15 13.1% 86.9% 42.1% 57.9% 93.1% 6.9% 
Ray 36 38.3% 61.7% 83.2% 16.8% 84.7% 15.3% 
Turbot 43 21.1% 78.9% 44.1% 55.9% 69.5% 30.5% 
Pouting 35 31.4% 68.6% 38.5% 61.5% 39.0% 61.0% 
Brill 43 13.6% 86.4% 69.1% 30.9% 80.7% 19.3% 
Red gurnard 40 33.0% 67.0% 82.3% 17.7% 79.1% 20.9% 
Megrim 32 13.7% 86.3% 40.5% 59.5% 74.0% 26.0% 
Black seabream 33 15.4% 84.6% 58.6% 41.4% 55.0% 45.0% 
John Dory 40 18.7% 81.3% 44.5% 55.5% 58.7% 41.3% 
Cod 32 20.4% 79.6% 74.3% 25.7% 69.2% 30.8% 
Dogfish 41 62.7% 37.3% 53.2% 46.8% 75.0% 25.0% 
Seabass (LC) 24 3.3% 96.7% 69.2% 30.8% 82.4% 17.6% 
Norway lobster (frozen) 16 16.5% 83.5% 78.3% 21.7% 83.3% 16.7% 
Gilthead seabream (NLC) 34 15.0% 85.0% 76.9% 23.1% 80.7% 19.3% 
Horse mackerel 39 30.1% 69.9% 84.8% 15.2% 91.6% 8.4% 
Capelin 7 18.9% 81.1% 14.0% 86.0% 63.6% 36.4% 
Octopus 35 24.2% 75.8% 78.1% 21.9% 84.5% 15.5% 
Tub gurnard 36 34.0% 66.0% 58.5% 41.5% 75.6% 24.4% 
Ling 32 5.4% 94.6% 58.1% 41.9% 74.3% 25.7% 
Lemon sole 33 17.9% 82.1% 65.3% 34.7% 56.3% 43.7% 
Smouth-hound 28 16.9% 83.1% 26.6% 73.4% 82.0% 18.0% 
Haddock 24 7.6% 92.4% 89.4% 10.6% 79.8% 20.2% 
Thornback ray 24 30.7% 69.3% 78.5% 21.5% 88.3% 11.7% 
Grey mullet 38 27.2% 72.8% 52.6% 47.4% 68.0% 32.0% 
Cuckoo ray 17 25.9% 74.1% 95.2% 4.8% 83.2% 16.8% 
Meagre 17 26.2% 73.8% 87.1% 12.9% 89.0% 11.0% 
Spider crab 30 20.1% 79.9% 75.8% 24.2% 75.6% 24.4% 
Crab 29 14.1% 85.9% 80.9% 19.1% 80.7% 19.3% 
Spotted ray 16 14.4% 85.6% 32.1% 67.9% 32.2% 67.8% 
Lobster 34 13.2% 86.8% 91.7% 8.3% 93.9% 6.1% 
Common seabream 7 25.3% 74.7% 28.6% 71.4% 64.2% 35.8% 
Common dab 18 13.2% 86.8% 88.6% 11.4% 85.9% 14.1% 
Sand sole 21 18.9% 81.1% 78.4% 21.6% 71.4% 28.6% 
Wedge sole 13 8.2% 91.8% 76.9% 23.1% 93.2% 6.8% 
Source: RIC 2002-2007, authors’ calculations. 
Note: NLC = not line-caught, LC = line-caught. V(between): between-market variance of the effect. V(within): within-market 
variance of the effect. 
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Table 6. Results of the principal component analysis 
Variables Component Inertia 
First Second Third Fourth Fifth Axis Proportion 
Fish characteristics -0.593 -0.148 0.055 0.383 0.690 1 0.457 
Time effects 0.144 0.846 0.336 -0.146 0.359 2 0.233 
Seller effects 0.469 0.024 0.198 0.856 -0.083 3 0.152 
Buyer effects 0.375 -0.508 0.631 -0.305 0.333 4 0.127 
Pure match effects 0.516 -0.058 -0.668 -0.076 0.527 5 0.032 
Source: RIC 2002-2007, authors’ calculations. 
Note: the first five columns give the coordinates of variance ratios on the five axes determined by the principal component 
analysis. Column labeled “Axis” gives the rank of the axis and “Proportion” gives the proportion of inertia of the cloud of 
species explained by the axis. 
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Table 7. Average shares of price variances for each of the four groups determined by the ascendant classical hierarchy 
Variables Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 All species 
Fish characteristics 44.6% 36.7% 21.3% 16.6% 32.4% 
Time effects 11.1% 5.6% 18.3% 8.0% 10.5% 
Seller effects 2.2% 4.1% 7.1% 9.1% 5.0% 
Buyer effects 11.1% 22.2% 18.3% 30.0% 19.3% 
Match effects 4.2% 6.0% 7.3% 8.3% 6.2% 
Source: RIC 2002-2007, authors’ calculations. 
Note: horse mackerel is excluded from the computation of the averages for all species as it is an outlier that is not taken 
into account in the analysis. 
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Appendix A. Estimation procedure 
Estimating the model without match effects 
When estimating equation (2), time effects can easily be taken into account with month-year 
dummies as there are only 72 months of data. The main difficulty is that there are many seller and 
buyer fixed effects, so that a direct estimation of the model with dummies for the two sets of fixed 
effects is unfeasible in practice. However, since the number of sellers is not that high, we can include 
seller dummies to take into account the set of seller fixed effects.  
We use the Frisch-Waugh theorem to deal with buyer fixed effects. We first sweep out buyer fixed 
effects using a within transformation in the buyer dimension. Ordinary Least Squares allow to 
recover the coefficients of fish characteristics as well as the month-year and seller fixed effects 
denoted respectively by ?̂?, ?̂?𝑡 and 𝛾�𝑗. Estimators of buyer fixed effects denoted 𝛿𝑘  can then be 
recovered from the second step of Frisch-Waugh theorem using the formula 𝛿𝑘 = ∑ �𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 −𝑖∈𝑘
𝑋𝑖?̂? − ?̂?𝑡 − 𝛾�𝑗� /𝑁𝑘, where 𝑁𝑘  is the number of transactions in which buyer 𝑘 is involved.  
 
Estimation of the model with match effects 
The parameters in equation (3a) are estimated using the Frisch-Waugh theorem. In a first step, 
variables are centered with respect to their mean computed at the level of the match between seller 
and buyer. This makes the terms 𝜇𝑗𝑘  disappear and the resulting equation can be estimated using 
Ordinary Least Squares. This allows to recover some estimators of the coefficients of fish 
characteristics and month-year fixed effects denoted ?̂? and ?̂?𝑡. An estimator of 𝜇𝑗𝑘  denoted ?̂?𝑗𝑘 is 
given by the second step of Frisch-Waugh theorem using the formula ?̂?𝑗𝑘 = ∑ (𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖?̂? −𝑖∈(𝑗,𝑘)
?̂?𝑡) /𝑁𝑗𝑘, where 𝑁𝑗𝑘  is the number of transactions between seller 𝑗 and buyer 𝑘. We can then rewrite 
equation (3b) as: 
?̂?𝑗𝑘 = 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝜂𝑗𝑘         (6) 
where 𝜂𝑗𝑘 = 𝜃𝑗𝑘 + ?̂?𝑗𝑘 − 𝜇𝑗𝑘  is the sum of the match effect and a sampling error arising from the 
fact that the dependent variable is an estimated parameter. Seller and buyer fixed effects can be 
taken into account with two sets of dummies. The resulting equation can then be estimated using 
Ordinary Least Squares, but this procedure is not efficient as it does not take properly into account 
the sampling error on the dependent variable. Therefore, we prefer to use Weighted Least Squares 
where the weights are the number of transactions per match 𝑁𝑗𝑘.
21  
                                                          
21 For the sake of robustness, we also computed the weighted least square estimator proposed by Card and Krueger (1992) 
where the weights are the inverse of the first-stage variances. This approach is much more time-consuming because it 
involves computing the standard errors of estimated fixed effects and it leads to very similar results which are available 
upon request. Considering the very large number of matches, Feasible General Least Square cannot be implemented. 
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As in the case of the model without match effects, parameters are estimated in two steps using the 
Frisch-Waugh theorem. Estimators of the seller and buyer fixed effects are denoted, respectively, 𝛾�𝑗 
and 𝛿𝑘. Finally, the estimator of the match effect is given by the formula 𝜃�𝑗𝑘 = ?̂?𝑗𝑘 − 𝛾�𝑗 − 𝛿𝑘. Note 
that replacing ?̂?𝑗𝑘  by its expression yields 𝜃�𝑗𝑘 = ∑ 𝜖?̂?𝑗𝑘𝑡𝑖∈(𝑗,𝑘) /𝑁𝑗𝑘, where 𝜖?̂?𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖?̂? − ?̂?𝑡 −
𝛾�𝑗 − 𝛿𝑘. Hence, estimated match effects are simply averages of estimated residuals computed at the 
match level.  
When the number of transactions is one, the estimated match effect is the single estimated residual. 
In that case, there is a clear identification issue, as the estimated match effect captures both the true 
match effect and the noise specific to the single transaction. We therefore conduct robustness 
checks by deleting transactions of matches involving less than 2, 5 or 10 transactions from the 
sample and replicating the analysis.  
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Appendix B. 
Figure B1. Month coefficients obtained from the hedonic price regression for sole  
 
Source: RIC 2002-2007, authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure B2. Month coefficients obtained from the hedonic price regression for monkfish  
 
Source: RIC 2002-2007, authors’ calculations. 
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Appendix C. 
Table C1. Characteristics of fish species from principal component analysis 
Fisch species Coordinates Contribution (in %) Cosine squared 
First 
component 
Second 
component 
First 
component 
Second 
component 
First 
component 
Second 
component 
Sole -1.290 0.410 1.656 0.328 0.784 0.079 
Hake -0.551 -0.700 0.303 0.957 0.164 0.265 
Monkfish -1.592 0.375 2.521 0.275 0.887 0.049 
Seabass (NLC) 0.525 0.482 0.275 0.455 0.156 0.132 
Red mullet 0.173 1.512 0.030 4.467 0.012 0.905 
Squid 1.076 1.933 1.151 7.297 0.147 0.474 
Whiting -0.090 -0.458 0.008 0.411 0.009 0.224 
Mackerel 2.010 -0.403 4.021 0.317 0.815 0.033 
Pollack 1.449 0.997 2.089 1.941 0.516 0.244 
Cuttlefish -0.229 -1.844 0.052 6.642 0.006 0.362 
Plaice -0.841 -1.067 0.704 2.223 0.305 0.491 
Conger eel -0.004 -0.619 0.000 0.748 0.000 0.397 
Norway lobster (live) -2.319 1.641 5.352 5.262 0.576 0.288 
Ray -1.481 -1.070 2.181 2.238 0.640 0.335 
Turbot -1.270 -0.147 1.606 0.042 0.900 0.012 
Pouting 0.552 -1.032 0.303 2.080 0.141 0.492 
Brill 0.680 -1.389 0.461 3.771 0.153 0.637 
Red gurnard 0.454 -2.019 0.205 7.964 0.022 0.439 
Megrim -0.671 -0.686 0.448 0.918 0.270 0.282 
Black seabream -1.277 -0.225 1.623 0.099 0.668 0.021 
John Dory -0.451 -0.069 0.202 0.009 0.129 0.003 
Cod -0.421 0.310 0.177 0.187 0.393 0.212 
Dogfish 1.317 0.533 1.725 0.554 0.336 0.055 
Seabass (LC) -1.795 2.010 3.207 7.896 0.440 0.552 
Norway lobster (frozen) -3.036 -0.080 9.169 0.013 0.902 0.001 
Gilthead seabream (NLC) 0.091 0.933 0.008 1.702 0.002 0.200 
Capelin -0.946 0.972 0.890 1.846 0.122 0.129 
Octopus 2.199 0.473 4.809 0.438 0.476 0.022 
Tub gurnard 1.869 -2.307 3.475 10.395 0.271 0.413 
Ling 2.020 0.996 4.060 1.939 0.509 0.124 
Lemon sole -0.959 -0.112 0.914 0.025 0.666 0.009 
Smouth-hound -0.178 0.164 0.032 0.053 0.085 0.072 
Haddock -1.897 0.538 3.579 0.566 0.908 0.073 
Thornback ray 0.039 -1.025 0.002 2.051 0.001 0.578 
Grey mullet 2.672 -1.325 7.104 3.429 0.753 0.185 
Cuckoo ray -2.865 -0.125 8.164 0.031 0.871 0.002 
Meagre 1.133 1.051 1.277 2.160 0.305 0.263 
Spider crab 2.093 -0.189 4.358 0.070 0.916 0.007 
Crab 2.023 0.012 4.072 0.000 0.475 0.000 
Spotted ray -1.715 -0.181 2.928 0.064 0.662 0.007 
Lobster 2.196 2.765 4.798 14.936 0.339 0.538 
Common seabream -0.980 -0.811 0.956 1.286 0.303 0.208 
Common dab -1.278 -0.659 1.624 0.848 0.698 0.186 
Sand sole 2.546 -0.259 6.450 0.131 0.842 0.009 
Wedge sole 1.019 0.692 1.033 0.937 0.564 0.260 
Source: RIC 2002-2007, authors’ calculations. 
Note: NLC = not line-caught, LC = line-caught. “Cosine squared” gives the square of the cosine of the angle between the 
species and the component. 
 
 
